The Market for Justice, the  Litigation Explosion,  and the  Verdict Bubble : A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials by Smalkin, Frederic N. & Smalkin, Frederic N.C.
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
2005
The Market for Justice, the "Litigation Explosion,"
and the "Verdict Bubble": A Closer Look at
Vanishing Trials
Frederic N. Smalkin
Judge in Residence, University of Baltimore School of Law, fsmalkin@ubalt.edu
Frederic N.C. Smalkin
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, fred.smalkin@baltimorecity.gov
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the
Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Market for Justice, the "Litigation Explosion," and the "Verdict Bubble": A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials, 1 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 417
(2006)








The Market For Justice, the "Litigation 
Explosion," and the "Verdict Bubble": 
A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials 
Frederic N. Smalkin and Frederic N.C. Smalkin* 
THE NUMBERS ........................................... . 
A LESSON FROM LEGAL HISTORy ...................... . 
THE JURY'S IN .......................................... . 
JUDICIAL ECONOMICS ................................... . 
THE JURY'S OUT ........................................ . 







"A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to decide who has the better 
lawyer." 
- Robert Frost 
I. THE NUMBERS 
As observed by Judge Young,l the number of federal civil jury trials2 
showed a remarkable decline of more than one-fourth in the decade 
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1. William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FED. LAW., July 2003, at 
30. 
2. As reported on a fiscal-year basis by the ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Statistics, 
Fiscal years 1997-2002, tbls.C-4, C-4a, & C-7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususd 
judbus.html. 
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1989-99.3 The authors have brought the numbers up to date, through 
fiscal year 2002. The decline has continued, as Table I below clearly 
demonstrates: 
TABLE I: 
TRIALS FY 1997-2002: JURY AND NONJURY 
FIll:. I '\11 If 
It is interesting to note from Table I that the decline in completed 
trials is not confined to jury trials, but extends to completed trials, both 
jury and nonjury, which correlate with an r2 of 0.99.4 This decline in 
total trials of both sorts is addressed neither by Young nor by much 
recent literature disparaging what is seen as judicial aversion to the 
jury; this is omitted for an important reason, explained below. 
3. The number of civil filings, in contrast, showed remarkably little fluctuation from 
1993 through 2002. The figures are: 1993-229,850; 1994-236,391; 1995-248,335; 
1996-269,132; 1997-272,027; 1998-256,787; 1999-260,271; 2000-259,517; 2001-250,907; 
2002-274,841. See id. at tbl.C. These figures readily lend themselves to a conclusion that 
many cases are simply not filed in the Article III forum in the first place, because, given a 
growing population (both in the general population and in the ranks of lawyers) and signifi-
cant yearly increases in statutory civil remedies from new legislation without offsetting re-
peal of older remedies, one would expect a substantial increase in the number of filings over 
the years rather than a plateau. 
4. The Administrative Office reports from which Table I is compiled do not separately 
report trials conducted by Magistrate Judges. Interestingly, the numbers of jury and non-
jury trials conducted by Magistrate Judges, with consent of the litigants, see 28 U.S.c. 
§ 636(c), show a decline from highs of 892 and 656, respectively, in 1998 to 472 and 487, 
respectively, in 2002, as reported in JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 2, at tbI.S-17. 
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It is illuminating to look to at least one major alternative to the 
federal trial-jury or nonjury-and that is the number of arbitrations 
instituted with the American Arbitration Association, set forth below 
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A simple comparison shows that while the number of federal trials 
has been decreasing markedly, the number of arbitrations has been in-
creasing markedly. Unfortunately, the limited nature of the data pre-
cludes a more statistically robust analysis of the correlation between 
jury trials and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Nevertheless, 
these obvious trends beget the questions: Where has the litigation gone, 
and is there good reason to suspect migration out of the judicial forum 
in favor of others, like arbitration, rather than simply natural growth in 
the number of arbitrations? 
Four possible answers suggest themselves, but can be dispatched 
without lengthy discussion. The first is that people are becoming gener-
ally less litigious. However, the number of federal civil filings has seen 
no significant decline over the relevant time period. One might next 
assume that the number of trials completed has declined simply be-
cause federal civil trials are getting postponed more often than in the 
past and untried civil cases are simply accumulating, while judges do 
other things, like deal with a burgeoning criminal caseload. This was 
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also investigated by the authors, but was found not to be the case, as 
the reported statistics show only a 2.8% increase in median time from 
filing to trial in civil cases between 1997 and 2002. A third possible 
answer is that cases filed recently are somehow systematically less "de-
serving" of trial, in some objective sense. However, there is little reason 
to believe that this is the case, even if such an assessment of relative 
merit could be made. Lastly, one might assume that these cases are 
being litigated in other judicial fora, but there is mounting evidence 
that jury trials in state court are systematically decreasing as well. 
Some would argue that a shift to arbitration is primarily or entirely 
the product of increased disparate bargaining power at the forum 
choice point, which is often at the time of contracting. But a few obser-
vations contraindicate unilateral imposition as the most likely explana-
tion of these trends. First, arbitration clauses are not universal enough 
to have the kind of impact seen in these figures. Second, while there 
has been much argument in favor of enforcing such forum choice 
clauses, they are still subject to nullification as contracts of adhesion 
and may be defeated under the minimum contacts test, placing their 
efficacy in doubt. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this hypothesis 
with the fact that federal civil filings have not been decreasing overall. 
This combination indicates that whatever primarily lies behind the de-
cline in trials is a result of choices made after the events giving rise to a 
claim. 
An explanation that appears to some to be intuitive is that judges 
are to blame. Some would argue that judges are intentionally discrimi-
nating against juries. In that case, we should expect to see a more dis-
tinct decline in jury trials, as compared to bench trials. Yet, as noted 
above, the decline in both jury and non-jury trials correlates almost 
perfectly. Alternatively, the decline has been attributed to a crushing 
federal workload, mainly due to increased criminal prosecutions. How-
ever, new judgeships are added each year to keep up with the volume 
of cases (fifteen in 2003), and in any event, this explanation does not 
address the surge in AD R seen in the last few years. 
A reliable indicator of trends affecting litigation is the proverbial 
man on the street, or, in our case, the lawyer at the water-cooler. Any-
one who spends more than a few minutes standing by a law firm water-
cooler will conclude, based on litigators' focus on "the twin v's" venue 
and venire, that a major strategic concern is the composition of the 
jury. Pretrial rulings on these issues will have an overriding impact on 
parties' willingness to settle, rather than proceed to trial. 
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Even if limitations imposed by the nature of the reported data pre-
clude demonstrating, with robust statistical significance, a direct causal 
relationship between declining federal trials and increasing arbitrations, 
arbitration is, at the very least, perceived as an attractive alternative 
forum by both those with disputes, who increasingly seek it, and at least 
one respected and experienced member of the federal judiciary, viz, 
Chief Judge Young. 
It just may be that judges are guilty of professional narrow-mind-
edness, but not the kind envisioned by Professor Miller and others. In 
other words, they are not shirking their responsibilities by denying par-
ties their day in court, but are failing to recognize the attractiveness of 
alternative fora and the implications this has for the judiciary. 
These observations lead us to suggest that fora can and do com-
pete in the market for litigation, and that litigation will tend to move, in 
obedience to ordinary market forces, to the least-cost forum, irrespec-
tive of party advantage. This paper attempts to describe the mecha-
nism through which juries systematically increase uncertainty and 
thereby impose costs on both sides, driving litigation not just away from 
the courts by settlements, but to alternative fora that are increasingly 
attractive to both plaintiffs and defendants. 
These trends are only keenly seen over time; trials declined for 
years before people started widespread discussion of the phenomenon. 
Phenomena that occur over time constitute a story. We therefore begin 
as any good story should-long, long ago. 
II. A LESSON FROM LEGAL HISTORY 
To a large extent, the history of the development of the legal sys-
tem of England from the time of the Norman Conquest through the 
end of the eighteenth century is the story of evolving notions of juris-
diction (in the sense of a forum's willingness to entertain a case, assum-
ing it has the power to do so). This evolution was powered by the 
interacting self-interests of fora and litigants. 
By the fifteenth century, the jurisdictions of the two superior na-
tional courts of England, within bounds set by Magna Carta, had be-
come fairly well settled by tradition and usage: King's Bench had 
jurisdiction over matters in which the Crown had an interest, while 
Common Pleas handled private disputes. Until the Crown fell into the 
hands of the Tudors at the end of the War of the Roses, the King's 
Bench was not a busy court, as compared to Common Pleas: "Its 
records filled only a few hundred skins of parchment a year, whereas 
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those of Common Pleas filled a thousand or two." During the fifteenth 
century, both of the superior courts experienced a migration of litiga-
tion to alternative fora, i.e., the King's Council and Chancery, where 
business was taken by "common lawyers, who resorted to them because 
of the attraction of their relative informality, the ease with which de-
fendants could be arrested, and the inquisitorial method of investiga-
tion which by-passed the sheriff and the jury." 
"[T]heir initial success was perceived as a threat to the business of 
the common-law courts." This loss of judicial business principally im-
pacted the King's Bench, which reacted by developing "swift process 
and procedure to vie with that of the Chancery, and acquired a jurisdic-
tion over most common pleas by a combination of procedural devices." 
This did not sit well with Common Pleas, resulting in the "legal disputes 
of the later sixteenth century [which] took on the appearance of an 
internecine struggle for business between the common-law courts 
themselves .... " Although the personnel of King's Bench had a per-
sonal stake "in furthering this amplification of their jurisdiction, they 
were at the same time meeting strong popular demands." The key 
point for the present analysis is that "popular demand" was Adam 
Smith's invisible hand, quietly guiding disputes into the forum where 
they could be resolved at least cost (risk being a form of cost): "The 
principal competitors were not the judges or officers [of the courts] 
themselves but the litigants and their lawyers, shopping for the most 
advantageous forum." 
King's Bench, in particular, went to lengths in order to attract 
more business. In the sixteenth century, "King's Bench wooed litigants 
with competitive costs, and sometimes even lowered its fees in order to 
increase the overall takings," a universal practice of the volume seller. 
Jurisdictional expansion was accomplished by a device labeled the "bill 
of Middlesex," which got around cumbersome, older mechanisms for 
acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant's person by alleging a fictional 
trespass occurring in the County of Middlesex, where King's Bench sat. 
There would be an allegation that the defendant had trespassed against 
the plaintiff in Hendon, and "[i]t mattered not whether the plaintiff or 
defendant had ever set foot in Hendon, or even Middlesex." The fic-
tional trespass would simply be disregarded, while the dispute pro-
ceeded to be resolved on its merits according to the common law, 
whether in trespass or in debt or detinue. The net effect of all this was 
to increase the business of the King's Bench by a factor of ten between 
1560 and 1640. This increase was clearly the result of competitive be-
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havior on the part of King's Bench, which "had no monopoly, and ... 
thrived only by satisfying litigants and the profession at large." 
Although Common Pleas attempted to meet the competition, it 
was bound to the ancient, cumbersome writ procedure for acquiring 
jurisdiction, and it could not resort to any fiction as convenient as the 
Bill of Middlesex. Furthermore, it was not economically competitive, 
as "it failed to make substantial reductions in its own scale of costs, 
allegedly because the three prothonotaries could never reach agree-
ment on any specific proposal for cuts." The Common Pleas did not 
see an overall diminution in its caseload, as there was an overall in-
crease in litigation during this period. Common Pleas' bar was ten 
times larger than that of King's Bench, and it included a substantial 
number of attorneys who practiced throughout the country, rather than 
simply at Westminster. Thus, "the business of the Common Pleas in-
creased considerably during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries, albeit at a slower rate than that of the King's Bench." 
Interestingly, the end of the King's Bench-Common Pleas competi-
tion was accomplished both by legislation in 1661 designed to cut back 
on King's Bench's jurisdictional fictions and by Common Pleas' own 
adoption of a jurisdiction-enhancing fiction in 1675. 
Why did these courts compete with each other for business in the 
first place throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Other 
than professional pride and prejudice, the most compelling motivation 
was the compensation of judges and other court officers. It was not 
until much later that the concept of English judicial and quasi-judicial 
office as a property right to be held in freehold, capable of being 
bought and sold, died out; remuneration of the judge in the form of fees 
was not replaced by a stated annual salary until 1826. In the period of 
intense jurisdictional competition discussed above, put simply, more lit-
igation meant more money lining the judicial robe. The courts were 
acting, in large part, out of selfish economic considerations when estab-
lishing their jurisdictions and setting their procedures. 
Interestingly, friction between the arbitral forum itself and the 
common law courts from economic competition can be traced back to 
the same period of inter-judicial competition addressed above. The 
great legal historian and Chancellor Lord Campbell observed: 
There was no disguising the fact that, as formerly, the emoluments of the 
Judges depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had no 
fixed salaries, there was great competition to get as much as possible of 
litigation into Westminster Hall, ... for the division of the spoil ... And 
they had great jealousy of arbitrations whereby Westminster Hall was 
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robbed of those cases which came not into Kings Bench, nor the Common 
Pleas, nor the Exchequer. Therefore they said that the courts ought not to 
be ousted of their jurisdiction, and that it was contrary to the policy of the 
law to do so. That really grew up only subsequently to the time of Lord 
Coke, and a saying of his was the foundation of the doctrine.5 
III. THE JURY'S IN 
The archetypal Anglo-American dispute resolution mechanism is, 
of course, the trial of issues of fact before the jury. Juries in English 
law predate the Norman Conquest. Over many centuries, and for a 
number of reasons, the jury's character underwent a remarkable 
change. With small license, the modern jury can conveniently be 
thought of as having evolved markedly from its ancestor, a group of 
locals essentially called as witnesses and sworn to speak the true facts 
as they knew them to the King's justices, as those justices came to the 
shires from the seat of government to extend the King's writ and to 
exercise his judicial power. During the fourteenth century, the jury 
gradually was transformed into a more neutral body of fact-finders, 
who were not expected to have first-hand knowledge of the disputants 
or their dispute. Judges exercised tremendous control over juries, and 
could even attaint them for a false verdict. Except for this element of 
judicial control, the modern American jury has not changed much in its 
basic role in the legal process from its Tudor ancestor to the present, 
though, as will be shown, it has changed markedly in its composition 
and-at least in England-its utilization. 
The English civil jury, ancestor of America's, has fallen into almost 
complete desuetude, with what, in historical perspective, has been re-
markable swiftness. It started with the enactment of the Common Law 
Procedure Act of 1854, enabling the parties to consent to fact-finding 
by the judge, as "[a]ll the experience suggested that judges were more 
likely to understand the factual issues them laymen, and were as compe-
tent to assess evidence." The decline was not only swift, it was broad: 
In the course of the twentieth century, however, the alternative of jury 
trial more or less disappeared. The very existence of an option made the 
decision to ask for a jury suspicious: it suggested the hope of confusion in 
a weak case, or the expectation of exorbitant damages in cases involving 
distressing details or high feelings .... Since 1933 parties have been al-
lowed juries only with leave of the court, except in cases of libel and a few 
5. [d. at 983-84 n.14 (punctuation in original) (quoting Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J.Ex. 308, 
313 (1856». In Kulukundis, Judge Frank, writing for the court, famously quipped about the 
doctrine under discussion: "Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad 
as its bark." !d. at 984. 
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other matters; and the courts have indicated their unwillingness to give 
such leave.6 
These developments are all the more remarkable because they 
took place without legislation, by the common consent of the partici-
pants in the English public adjudication market, primarily English law-
yers (who have been historically precluded from taking cases on a 
contingent fee basis). In short, the market for civil jury trials in En-
gland simply dried up. 
American federal courts, of course, do not enjoy the ability of their 
English cousins simply to dispense with the civil jury as unreliable or 
outmoded. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution guarantees 
most federal civil litigants a jury trial when the enormous sum of twenty 
dollars is in controversy, and many state constitutions provide similar 
guarantees. 
The jury of the Seventh Amendment's Age of Enlightenment and 
the modern civil trial jury are, however, two very different institutions. 
Again, history is instructive. 
Alexis de Tocqueville praised the common law jury of his age, call-
ing it "as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the 
people as universal suffrage." Of course, it is well known that suffrage 
in America at the time of de Tocqueville was far from universal; indeed, 
it was not until much later that traditionally excluded groups (women 
of all races and African-Americans) gained the right to vote. And what 
of juries? Were they, in de Tocqueville's day, as far from representative 
of the general population as was the electorate? Surprisingly, at least in 
the federal courts, they were; and, more surprisingly, they remained so 
until well into the latter half of the twentieth century. Indeed, it has 
been said that "Eighteenth-century juries were, ... 'the Rotarians of 
their day.'" 
The procedure for assembling a jury venire in the federal district 
courts was not made uniform throughout the country until enactment 
of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. Before that Act, most 
6. [d. Although juries are still used in serious criminal cases in England, the Blair 
Government tried as recently as July 2003, to do away with them in a range of complex and 
difficult cases. The Government's proposal was effectively defeated in the House of Lords. 
Press Release, Associated Press, House of Lords Overturns Government Plan to End Trial By 
Jury for Complex Fraud Cases (July 15, 2003), available at www.westlaw.com (AP Worldstar 
Directory). This led to one of the more interesting legal observations of all time. The Home 
Office Minister, Baroness Scotland, QC, was quoted as having told lTV News, in reaction to 
the Lords' decision, that the abolition of jury trials as sought by the Government was a "real 
reform. We're allowing the guilty really to have an opportunity to be found guilty." Andrew 
Pierce, The Lords, TIMES (London), July 17,2003, at 6. 
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federal juries were selected by the "key man" system. The chief judge 
of the district selected a "key man" who would assemble a venire for a 
term of court, calling upon individuals personally known or recom-
mended to him who would make "good" jurors, in his estimation. 
From this venire, the petit juries were empanelled at trial, after voir 
dire conducted by the trial judge. As the legislative history of the 1968 
Act so eloquently understated it, "[o]ften the [key man] system results 
in under-representation of craftsmen, service workers, and laborers as 
compared with the professional and managerial classes." In fact, the 
federal trial jury known to the previous generation of lawyers was a 
select jury. 
Surprisingly little is said in general English legal history texts about 
the method of jury selection at common law. We do know, however, 
that sheriffs of the counties played the key role in jury selection. For 
example, in the course of discussing the general state of political and 
legal corruption in the fifteenth century, one distinguished scholar 
noted, "[t]he sheriffs were the tools of greater men, and, through their 
power over juries, the law of the country was at their mercy." The so-
called gentleman jury, impaneled by the sheriff for important cases, was 
limited by law to gentlemen of what for the time was substantial wealth 
("men of quality"); and, in some cases, required a venire to be assem-
bled from those "legally entitled to be called esquire, or a person of 
high decree [sic], such as a banker, a merchant, or the head of a dwell-
ing rated at not less than one-hundred pounds in a town of 20,000 or 
fifty pounds elsewhere." 
The "gentleman jury," moreover, was only one type of jury, and 
none of the others was very different in terms of its lack of 
inclusiveness: 
Four types of special juries existed in common law England. The first 
type, the gentleman jury, consisted of men of high social or economic sta-
tus. The second type, the struck jury, was selected upon the demand of 
either party and consisted of principal landowners selected from a list of 
forty-eight names. The third type, the professional jury, had members 
who possessed special knowledge or expertise. The fourth and most 
unique type, the party jury, attempted to ensure a foreign defendant of 
fairness by encompassing only individuals who were the same race, sex, or 
origin as the defendant.? 
Of course, the "key man" system utilized in federal practice until 
the late 1960s did not differ much in terms of its product from the sub-
jective selection processes noted above and no doubt familiar to those 
7. Jd. at 8-9. 
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who drafted the Seventh Amendment. And the practice was not much 
different in most state courts, select juries yielding only over time to 
those chosen, as today, from the populace at large (or some segment 
thereof, such as registered voters), more or less at random. The pre-
sent, randomly selected and minimally qualified (i.e., meeting only cri-
teria such as having a driver's license or being registered to vote) jury 
may be labeled the "modern" jury. 
IV. JUDICIAL ECONOMICS 
Of course, judges are no longer remunerated by fees (or, one 
hopes, in bribes), but are paid a stated salary, no matter how much or 
how little judicial business comes before them. Thus, they no longer 
have any financial motive to increase the judicial business of the courts 
on which they serve; rather, if there is too much judicial business, there 
may be an incentive to decrease it. As discussed above, it has been 
suggested that judges are selfishly abandoning their duties, for example, 
by unjustifiably granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
But an examination of their actions alone is misdirected, though under-
standable. It is quite natural to conclude that judges will do what they 
can to avoid the hard work of conducting trials, but it is not a lack of 
judges' services (supply) that is shifting the market to ADR. In fact, 
the shortfall is in demand for the ultimate exercise of judicial author-
ity-the trial-which can spring only from the popUlation of litigants. 
Much has been written addressing the rising costs of litigation, 
most of which focuses on the cost and delay associated with a modern 
jury trial of the facts. Time has always been equated with money, as the 
old saying bears witness, and the delay and added work associated with 
the jury trial burden both sides. 
The burgeoning role of jury experts points us to the crux of the 
topic at hand. Any lawyer has some conception of his ideal jury panel, 
but jury consulting firms go far beyond the practitioner's common 
sense and employ professional psychologists and sociologists. Why 
would a litigant add so drastically to litigation costs, when already faced 
with mounting expenditures? The answer lies in the existence and per-
ception of risk in today's jury system. 
As history demonstrates, there is a market in dispute resolution, 
and there is no reason to think it behaves any differently from other 
markets. In today's adjudication market, economists have identified as 
a driving force the implicit cost of the jury-the risk that comes from 
the jury's uncertainty of outcome. Modern market theory, well estab-
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lished and accepted in the field of economics, tells us that bearing risk 
is work, just like any other, and is compensated as such. We assume 
this has not been central to much previous legal analysis because the 
relevant economic literature is fairly recent, and the factors involved 
are not explicit costs in classic economic theory. 
All legal professionals have been exposed to the concept of bear-
ing risk as work, although they may not be aware of it. It is common 
knowledge that plaintiffs' lawyers seek to maximize fees, taking advan-
tage of the so-called "American rule" that tolerates contingency pay-
ments that are often quite large. Their size is justified (and accepted by 
even those who stand in moral opposition to what they do) because 
these lawyers are not guaranteed payment in every case. But that is 
only half the story; the key here is that their higher fees are justified not 
only with regard to individual cases, but over their entire careers be-
cause, aside from being lawyers, they are also in the business of being 
small banks that finance litigation. They are entitled to a sort of inter-
est payment that defense attorneys do not charge, because the latter do 
not carry risk. 
Once assessed, risk can be divided into two kinds, "systemic" and 
"idiosyncratic." These categories of risk can be applied to the judicial 
system if we consider the payoff from a case-whether it be an award 
or the avoidance thereof-as a sort of legal "security." 
The behavior of the securities market has been the subject of con-
siderable study. In that market, idiosyncratic risk describes uncertain-
ties associated with a particular security. In law, idiosyncratic risk 
would be the unknowns of an individual case, such as a client's informa-
tion not divulged to counselor uncertainty of outcome. (Indeed, a cer-
tain amount of risk is necessary to have a live case or controversy, the 
risk being uncertainty about the applicable law or the facts.) In theory, 
idiosyncratic risk can be minimized by diversification. For example, a 
plaintiff's lawyer who takes, on a contingency basis, a large number of 
cases might typically charge a smaller percentage than another plain-
tiff's lawyer who only pursues a small number of large cases. A useful 
analogy would be to compare a bank with a large volume of small loans 
to a venture capital firm that has a small number of very large loans. 
In contrast, systemic risk applies to variables that affect multiple 
securities and those securities' collective response. Having factored out 
idiosyncratic risk, evaluating systemic risk allows careful investors to 
choose precisely the amount of risk they wish to bear and, accordingly, 
the compensation they wish to receive. Investing is again illustrative, as 
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in the simple case of bonds versus stocks. An investor with a long-time 
horizon would choose a diversified portfolio of stocks, which are far 
riskier in the short-term but bring higher reward in the long-term. 
Nearing retirement, the investor would move her money into bonds, 
giving up remuneration, but lowering her risk. This phenomenon is re-
flected in the practice of law; it is generally true that those who practice 
in the less predictable areas of the law (such as plaintiffs' tort work) ask 
an accordingly higher compensation, usually in the form of a contin-
gency fee that can run into the millions, as opposed to an hourly fee or 
"value billing." But, salient legal risk depends not only on the merits or 
circumstances of an individual case, or even its general type, but also on 
the forum that entertains it. If we think of the courts as stocks, and 
ADR as bonds, the modern jury brings systemic risk-especially from 
high-end outlier verdicts-to the courts. Hence, the careful investor, in 
our case the prudent lawyer, can maximize gains or minimize losses by 
choosing one dispute resolution mechanism over the other. 
As mentioned above, there is evidence that it was the self-interest 
of litigants and their attorneys that dictated forum choice in the Tudor 
through Stuart periods. Self-interest, as a basic motivator of human 
behavior, of course, cannot be expected to have disappeared or dimin-
ished appreciably in the few hundred years since the jurisdictional wars 
of the English courts came to an end. If a litigant has the power to 
maneuver the resolution of a dispute into a forum perceived as more 
advantageous to him-whether from the standpoint of exposure to un-
predictable high outlier verdicts, speed and cost of adjudication, or 
other factors-both common sense and microeconomic theory suggest 
that he will do so, as, for example, by inserting a binding arbitration 
clause or other sort of forum selection clause (e.g., home-state, federal 
court only) in a contract. And, of course, those same fundamental 
forces suggest that, if both sides perceive the advantage of one forum 
over another, their behavior will demonstrate mutual accord, even if no 
agreement on dispute resolution was reached in a particular case ex 
ante. 
Estimations of a forum's cost have various roots and take various 
forms. There are some obvious factors that will influence litigants. For 
example, defense lawyers quite naturally and correctly perceive that a 
judge is less likely to award a huge amount of damages (especially for 
non-economic injury or punitive damages) than a jury (yet, there are 
data showing that plaintiffs have a higher mean success rate in a num-
ber of categories of cases, in terms of win/loss, not of damage award 
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size, when a judge is the fact-finder). One should note, though, that 
alternative dispute resolution does not always (or necessarily) benefit 
the defendant alone. For example, the speed and low cost with which 
arbitration can settle a dispute may work in favor of the plaintiff's at-
torney who handles a large volume of cases and/or is underwriting costs 
for an impecunious clientele. 
Although there are arguably many possible costs and benefits that 
might steer either side towards a particular forum, economic analysis 
demonstrates that the observed drift away from the jury is the product 
of a mutual decision. Recent articles have shown that parties on both 
sides of a case will seek to avoid an unpredictable verdict. Further-
more, the Coase Theorem states that actors will seek efficiency by co-
operating to divide the surplus created by adding value or, as this paper 
proposes, eliminating waste. If the only alternative is settlement, then 
parties will be induced to settle. However, if there is some value to be 
had in bringing a dispute before a third party, then, where ADR is 
available, parties will seek it instead of trial. Thus, so long as both sides 
perceive that they can get "justice," and if it can be had at a lower cost, 
the dispute-resolution process will migrate to the least expensive 
alternative. 
In short, the variability of jury awards-especially the "outlier" 
verdicts at the upper extreme-tends to make the system economically 
inefficient, and this inefficiency creates excess profits and costs. Re-
turning to our earlier question, and as an example, one such cost is the 
fee of the jury consultant, who is hired in an attempt to reduce the 
variance introduced by the jury. The money that a defendant's jury 
consultant is paid can be thought of as a slice of the "pure profit pie" 
that the plaintiff's lawyer might receive, were the consultants not able 
to advise their client to select a jury that minimizes the risk of an outlier 
verdict. 
V. THE JURY'S OUT 
Of course, despite popular sentiment, there is not universal agree-
ment that very high outlier verdicts or even a "litigation explosion" ac-
tually exist to a significant extent. In fact, Professor Arthur Miller, 
rests a large part of his argument against the overzealous grant of sum-
mary judgment on his perception that there has been no "litigation ex-
plosion." He argues that, overall, the number of cases filed is not 
growing disproportionately to the population. He also downplays a 
perceived rising tide in jury damage awards: "[A] RAND Institute of 
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Civil Justice study finding that mean jury verdicts increased in Cook 
County and San Francisco . . . found that the median jury verdict 
figures, when certain procedural changes in San Francisco were ac-
counted for, actually remained 'strikingly stable' over the twenty-five-
year period." An increase, however, in the mean-but not the me-
dian-most likely reflects an increasing incidence of high-end outlying 
verdicts. That is, it is reasonable to conclude that, as the high-end 
awards move higher, the variance in awards-and therefore risk-in-
creases, because there is no reason to believe that, over the span of 
time studied, the bulk of verdicts became more concentrated around 
the median. Even those who might doubt that the empirical evidence 
for variance substantiates perceptions of variance adduced by anecdo-
tal evidence do not doubt the reality of the perceptions themselves and 
their effect on the vanishing jury trial. 
In short, drastic unpredictability inheres in the power of the jury 
(above and beyond its basic determination of a verdict on liability-a 
process which itself has come under academic scrutiny) to fix damage 
awards, as it sees fit, with limited review, and with reversal only in the 
most egregious cases, and even then, not often. The jury can be seen as 
a sort of "black box" into which various versions of the facts are 
dumped and from which an unpredictable answer rolls out. No one 
suggests that the award of damages should be taken out of the jury's 
province altogether, or that there is a need radically to overhaul theo-
ries underlying damage awards. Indeed, scholars have shown that puni-
tive damages are an efficient means to achieve proper deterrence. But 
excessive damage awards have an inefficient over-deterrent effect. 
More importantly, the simple possibility of excessive damages-
whether compensatory or punitive-raises costs for litigants across the 
board and affects the dynamics of settlement. This phenomenon was 
noted in a recent law review article, in terms of its effect on "repeat 
player" defendants: "[F]or insurance companies and other repeat liti-
gants, a major goal (if not the major goal) in pretrial negotiations must 
be to avoid those huge verdicts that inflate the mean awards." Econo-
mists might deem this whole situation, instead of a "litigation explo-
sion," a "verdict bubble." 
Legal economists have advanced numerous theories in an attempt 
to arrive at an efficient calculation of damages, concentrating on puni-
tive damages, which, of course, are purely non-economic damages, i.e., 
are not premised upon any loss to the plaintiff reducible to dollars. 
One impediment to rationalizing the process is that jurors often en-
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counter difficulty comprehending and implementing a judge's instruc-
tions. A recent study has shown that even when presented with a 
model (e.g., the Polinsky-Shavell model) for determining punitive dam-
ages, jurors will arrive at "incorrect" determinations, i.e., those that are 
not efficient. Indeed, other research drawing on psychology has shown 
that factors such as so-called "benchmarks," subconsciously set in the 
jurors' minds by external sources such as the media, can be just as de-
terminative as the factors that jurors "should" weigh to achieve an effi-
cient outcome. What is most intriguing, and perhaps highly significant, 
is that jurors' abilities to weigh properly the factors that determine effi-
cient damages seem to vary directly with demographic variables. The 
data suggest that jury awards are not only positively correlated to the 
demographic makeup of the jury, but also to other, broader socioeco-
nomic factors, such as the poverty rate in the community from which 
the venire is drawn. Factor in group dynamics that actually tend to 
increase the variability of jury awards with random, cross-sectional jury 
selection, and the conclusion is inevitable that variability, risk, and costs 
all must be higher now than in the days of the select jury. 
The unpredictability and unreliability of modern jury discretion in 
fixing punitive damages has been well-documented, as discussed above. 
One would certainly expect the same sort of unpredictability and unre-
liability to inhere in an average jury's ability to fix compensatory dam-
ages, particularly in light of the fact that jurors' accuracy in determining 
punitive awards is directly correlated to their socioeconomic and educa-
tional background, a factor that would seem to figure equally in a com-
pensatory damage calculation, especially for non-economic damages, 
such as pain and suffering. In such cases, juror sympathy or empathy 
can be played upon by a skillful plaintiff's attorney like Perlman plays a 
fine Stradivarius. We may safely speculate that research would show a 
general migration by defendants toward courts whose juries are drawn 
from the higher socioeconomic strata. Indeed, removal of cases from 
urban state courts to federal courts (with venires drawn from suburban 
and rural areas as well as from the urban area) has been noted anecdot-
ally as a favored tactic of the defense, as has avoidance of certain rural 
or depressed counties that are "plaintiff-friendly" in terms of high-end 
verdicts. In short, the social forces that brought about the demise of 
the select jury have injected an element of increased risk (flowing from 
unpredictability and variability at the highest end) that, at least in the 
perception of some of the users, renders the system inefficient. Obvi-
ously, there are potentially as many factors that could account for vari-
2006] A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials 433 
ance in verdicts among juries hearing similar cases as there are factual 
differences among cases, and we do not mean to suggest that the com-
position of the jury is the sole determinant of variance and unpredict-
ability, but it is nonetheless a very important one that must be taken 
into account in explaining the lamented disappearance of the jury trial. 
To find anecdotal evidence that the verdict bubble is real and is not 
a geographically isolated phenomenon, one need go no further than a 
major city's classified telephone directory. In one such East Coast di-
rectory, one finds advertisements for lawyers who have "won verdicts 
and settled cases involving millions of dollars: $3.3 MILLION awarded 
for negligent death ... $2.4 MILLION awarded ... $3.35 MILLION 
awarded ... $5 MILLION awarded .... " A few pages later is an ad for 
a lawyer who claims damage awards won in amounts of $10,250,000, 
$4,100,000, $7,390,000, and $12,000,000, and who boasts that "juries just 
love him." The perception of huge jury awards as the norm-based 
perhaps on a factor as inherently unpredictable as a jury's "love" for a 
particularly personable lawyer-is thusly formed. 
As the movie Wall Street's fictional tycoon Richard Gekko noted, 
"The most valuable commodity I know of is information." This is true 
because it is information that drives markets to efficiency, or ineffi-
ciency. While Miller notes, correctly, that "jury awards considered ex-
cessively high often are reduced by the court or by the parties 
themselves by way of settlement, or are reversed altogether on ap-
peal[,]" the damage of unpredictable variance is done as soon as the 
verdict is returned. Because these large awards form subliminal 
benchmarks for future jurors-and the initial verdict is sure to be the 
front page, while its reduction, if it comes, will get one-half column inch 
on page twenty-three-the verdict bubble is a self-reinforcing phenom-
enon. It matters not what the final outcomes of individual cases are 
because the mere public perception of rising jury awards adds momen-
tum to the same; this creates a trickle-down effect. If plaintiffs perceive 
even the slightest chance of receiving a very large verdict, the power of 
numbers and expected returns substantially raises their leverage in de-
manding a settlement. In this way, the jury's influence today extends 
beyond its immediate domain and raises costs for litigants across the 
board, above the level that represents efficiency. 
VI. THE VERDICT 
Given sufficient information, markets will not tolerate inefficien-
cies. The modern jury trial entails such an inefficiency. To escape the 
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real and perceived costs of the federal jury trial, litigants are flocking to 
arbitration and other forms of ADR. The expectation is that, there, 
plaintiffs will find faster and less expensive justice and defendants will 
be more likely to have their "punishment fit the crime," thereby avoid-
ing the "deep-pocket" phenomenon and optimizing the risk vs. benefit 
for both sides. 
The inescapable fact is that, unless prohibited from doing so by law 
or conduct of their adversaries, disputants will do as they please. This 
is not to say that traditional trials will disappear. But there are some 
often-overlooked aspects to the decline in tried cases that argue for 
again making the courts more attractive to litigants. Most importantly, 
as dispute resolution moves out of the courts, society is necessarily de-
prived of a number of cases that could advance our body of law by 
adding new precedents. And, as any lawyer knows, trials as learning 
opportunities for junior members of the bar are increasingly rare. 
Many "litigators" have garnered most of their experience at depositions 
or in mock proceedings, thus diminishing the body of experiential 
learning, not to mention "war stories," which themselves play an im-
portant educational role. 
We have demonstrated that, like any market, the adjudication mar-
ket is subject to forces beyond the control of any single actor, but the 
inputs of every actor undoubtedly influence the market. Accordingly, 
those who think the federal courts should retain a significant part of the 
adjudication market should seriously consider making those courts 
more attractive. This requires the difficult step of questioning whether 
the modern jury, as an exercise in pure democracy, is the appropriate 
dispute-resolver for all cases, especially complex or otherwise difficult 
ones. Commentators have questioned whether, for example, "it [is] fair 
to ask a millworker, school custodian, receptionist, plumber, nurse's aid 
[sic], housewife, and others possessing no expertise in economics or ac-
counting, to render an accurate verdict based on average variable cost 
determinations and tax consequences of inventory accounting?" The 
question might just as well have been put as to whether it makes sense 
to do so, a question that has been answered no in England and most 
other industrialized nations. One answer is to return, at least in com-
plex commercial cases, to a more select jury than the "modern" one. 
Although, to be sure, any return to greater selectivity in jury venire 
selection according to educational achievement or particular expertise 
implicates sensitive social and, perhaps, constitutional questions, it has 
been suggested in the literature. If such a course-even given adequate 
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safeguards against intentional, invidious discrimination-is too politi-
cally unpalatable to be implemented, lesser measures to influence the 
sophistication of the venire can surely be undertaken without objection, 
e.g., discontinuation of the practice of granting automatic (whether de 
jure or de facto) exemptions to classes of individuals such as proprie-
tors of businesses, doctors, and the like. While we have not found any 
reported data, we seriously doubt that many executive officers of For-
tune 500 companies are empanelled in jury venires, let alone actually 
serve as trial jurors. 
The bottom line is this: Serious consideration should be given to 
offering appropriate alternatives to the current jury selection process in 
appropriate cases if the federal courts are to continue to present a via-
ble choice for those shopping for dispute resolution. Otherwise, one 
can reasonably expect that the decline in cases reaching trial-in favor 
of other forms of dispute resolution-can, on the basis of elemental 
market forces, be expected to continue at its present, fairly steady rate 
to some irreducible minimum, perhaps consisting mostly of suits involv-
ing irrational litigants or those with nothing to lose by "rolling the 
dice." The question is whether resistance to jury reform can be over-
come by those in the position-and with the determination-to at least 
experiment with meaningful change. 
